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THE CASE OF THE UNDISTRIBUTED EARNED
SURPLUS
T HE ancient sage Ben Zakai, when expounding the laws of
false weights and measures, is said to have exclaimed:
"Woe unto us if we tell them, and woe unto us if we don't
tell them. If we tell them, they will learn how to circumvent
the law, and if we don't tell them, they will say the sages are
without learning in these matters." 1 Commentators on the
income tax laws must, in these days, share the same feeling
of frustration. Yet the example of the great sage in expounding the law must be followed.
Lawyers who are familiar with the tax dilemmas of
their clients will rank high the problem of the undistributed
earned surplus of the one man, or family-owned, corporation.
Despite war time taxes, including excess profits taxes, which
often drained nearly 90% of the net profits of corporations
into the federal treasury, and despite liberal salaries paid to
officers, and even occasional dividends to the stockholders,
many companies accumulated large cash surpluses and, in
many cases not yet affected by the recession, are continuing
to do so. The stockholders whose enterprise produced these
luxurious growths of monetary rewards find themselves in a
sorry predicament. Should the corporation declare the surplus in dividends, it would surely be consumed in personal
income taxes. 2 On the other hand, to allow the surplus to
remain unused in the corporate treasury is to expose it to
the hazards of business, to deprive one of its present enjoyment, and to run the risk of substantial depletion thereof by
the application of Section 102 of the Internal Revenue
Code,3 or the possible revival of some form of undistributed
I2 TALMTUD,

TRACrATE BABA BATHRA, p. 89b.
Under existing rates, the tax levied by the Federal Government on a
dividend of $200,000 received by a stockholder would be in excess of $150,000;
and for sums in excess of $200,000, the income tax would approximate 90%
of the dividend received. See Internal Revenue Code, Sections 11 and 12.
3 As to the problems raised by Section 102, see Cary, Accumulations Beyond the Reasonable Needs of the Business: The Dilezmma of Section 102(c),
60 HARV. L. Rlv. 1282 (1947).
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profits tax. 4 No Scylla or Charybdis could be more disheartening.
The simplest procedure is, of course, the complete liquidation of the corporation. By this process, the cash surplus
as well as all the other assets of the corporation are distributed to the stockholders who may thereupon pay a
capital gain tax on the excess of the proceeds from liquidation over the base cost of the stock. 5 The good will of the
corporation as well as its future earning power are in that
case, however, lost to the stockholders. This untoward result is averted where there are several classes of stock and
the cash surplus, or a substantial part thereof, can be utilized
to redeem an entire class of stock, leaving the corporation in
a position to carry on the business.6 Or, where there are
several stockholders, it is possible for the corporation to
cancel or redeem all of the stock of one of the stockholders
who would, in such event, be liable only for a capital gain
tax. 7

But if only a percentage of the stock of all the stock-

holders, or even of one stockholder is redeemed or cancelled,
the cash received by the stockholder will normally be treated
as a dividend.8 No doubt, there are situations in which the
4 The Internal Revenue Act of 1936, §§ 14, 27, 49 STAT. 1648-1756 (1936),
imposed a tax on undistributed profits. This was dropped in subsequent revenue acts.
5INT. Rav. CODE §§ 115(c), 115(d); 1j. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.115-5.
6 Ibid., § 115(i) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.115-5; White v. United States,
305 U. S. 281 (1938); Helvering v. Weaver, 305 U. S. 293 (1938).
7 .....,a cancellation or redemption by a corporation of all of the stock
of a particular shareholder, so that the shareholder ceases to be interested in
the affairs of the corporation, does not effect a distribution of a taxable
dividend." U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.115-9.
8Ibid. See also INT. R v. CODE § 115(g) providing that if a corporation
cancels or redeems its stock in such manner as to be equivalent to a dividend,
it will be taxed as such. In the second circuit, it had been held that distribution of accumulated earnings in cancellation of stock could never be "essentially
equivalent" to a dividend. Di Nobili Cigar Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d
436 (2d Cir. 1937).
But this proposition has been discarded sub silentia,
Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner, 155 F. 2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
In this case, the court said, "What other test will
329 U. S. 726 (1946).
satisfy the language of Section 115(g) we need not now attempt to say;
perhaps the section covers all cancellations or redemptions which result in the
distribution of accumulated earnings." This language can hardly be squared
with Section 115(i) which defines "amounts distributed in partial liquidation"
as any distributions made by a corporation "in complete liquidation or redemption of part of its stock." This proposition, that is, that stock cancelled or
redeemed by a corporation out of accumulated earnings is equivalent to a dividend under Section 115(g) is said to rest on the decision of the Supreme Court
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purchase by the corporation of a part of the stock of one or
even of all of the stockholders might be dictated by motives
other than the avoidance of the tax on dividends. Where
such a good business reason exists, there is room for the
argument that the distribution is not a dividend but a mere
sale of stock to the corporation and the proceeds should,
therefore, be taxed as a capital gain.
Basically, the line between taxation of the stockholders'
receipts as dividends, on the one hand, or proceeds of the
sale on the other, must depend upon whether the stockholder
is actually parting with something when he surrenders his

stock to the corporation.

Where all the stockholders of a

corporation surrender the same percentage of stock to the
corporation, it is plain that no essential differences in their
relationship to the corporate entity are effected; but where
the percentages surrendered are not uniform among stockholders, an actual change in the relationship between them
results, and there is ground for the opinion that in such cases
the distribution should not be regarded as a dividend.
Recently, the Tax Court has held 9 that the sale of stock

by a stockholder to a wholly owned subsidiary of a corporain Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U. S. 283 (1945). But that case
arose under the provisions of Section 112 and involved a reorganization consisting of a recapitalization in which the stockholders received in exchange for
their old stock, new stock plus cash. As the cash was derived from accumulated net earnings, the court held that it was equivalent to a dividend under the
provisions of Section 112. Explicitly, the court held that Section 115(i) was
not involved. "Respondent, however, claims that this distribution more nearly
has the effect of a 'partial liquidation' as defined in Section 115(i). But the
classifications of Section 115, which governs 'Distributions of Corporations'
apart from reorganizations, were adopted for another purpose. They do not
apply to a situation arising within Section 112. The definition of a 'partial
liquidation' in Section 115(i) is specifically limited to use in Section 115. To
attempt to carry it over to Section 112 would distort its purpose." But the
circuit court in the Kirschenbaumn case, supra, dismisses this distinction with
the statement that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the phrase "equivalent
to a dividend" in Section 112 is binding upon the lower courts in interpreting
Section 115(i), in spite of the Supreme Court's caveat that the two sections
have different purposes.
Moreover, where the corporation purchases its stock and holds same in
the treasury for resale the circuit court in the Kirschenbatm case, supra at 25,
reiterated its holding in Alpers v. Commissioner, 126 F. 2d 58 (2d Cir. 1942),
that the acquired shares were neither "cancelled or redeemed" and, therefore,
not within Section 115(i). It is noteworthy that this dictum is from an opinion
written by Judge Learned Hand, who dissented in the Alpers case, supra.
9 Trustees of Common Stock of John Wanamaker, etc. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 11 T. C. 365 (1948).
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tion does not result in a taxable dividend, even if the sale
to the corporation itself would have involved such a determination. The opinion of the Tax Court makes it clear that
the decision is made necessary by the language of the statute
itself. In principle, it is difficult to see any reason for the
distinction between the sale of stock to the corporation and
the sale to its wholly owned subsidiary whose funds are entirely available to the corporation.
Where the stockholders sell their stock outright to a
third party, there is, of course, no difficulty about treating
the proceeds as a capital gain. Practical obstacles, however,
to such sales are evident. It is difficult, in the first place, to
find purchasers who are willing to buy the stock in companies which have accumulated large surpluses. The burden
with regard thereto, in such cases, is simply transferred from
the seller to the purchaser. Even where a sale of that sort
could be made, say to a competitive company which might
have some use for the corporate assets as well as its cash
surplus, the seller could not expect to receive par for the
frozen dollars in the corporate surplus. Of necessity, such
sales partake of the nature of distress sales and do not
realize what most people, who have toiled over the years to
build up corporate enterprise, regard as fair value.
A wholly different result, however, is obtained where the
sale of the corporate stock is made to an institution exempt
under Section 101 of the Internal Revenue Act. 10 Such an
institution can afford to pay par for the frozen dollars, to
pay a fair price for the going concern value of the business,
and can even afford to give the seller a net profit over the
value of the assets. The reason for this ability so generously
to deal with the business to be sold is that the tax exempt
institution can forthwith withdraw the surplus, when it becomes the owner of the stock, as a dividend and being exempt
from taxation can use the whole surplus to reimburse itself
for the purchase price." Moreover, under certain circum10 Finkelstein, Freedom From Uncertainty in Income Tax Exemption, 48
MICH. L. REv. 449 (1950).
11 As I have shown elsewhere definitive rulings by the Supreme Court have
not yet been made, despite the holding in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263
U. S. 578 (1924).
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stances, it would seem that the tax exempt institution could
operate the business without paying any income tax on its
profits at all and could, therefore, use a portion of the profits
to meet deferred payments on the purchase price of the stock
borrowed or advanced
or to reimburse itself for monies 12
wherewith to complete the purchase.
Indeed, the sale of the corporate stock to a tax exempt
institution would seem to be a copper riveted method of
translating the cash surplus into a fund in the hands of the
stockholders subject only to a capital gain tax; and this
would be so even if it were ultimately to be held that the
business so purchased by the tax exempt institution were not
tax exempt with respect to its future earnings."2 The withdrawal of the surplus by the tax exempt institutional stockunder well settled doctrine, be
holder, as a dividend, would,
14
exempt.
tax
necessarily
Recently, the vogue of selling industrial concerns to tax
exempt institutions has both become popular and attracted
comment. 15 Where the purchase price is furnished by the
tax exempt corporation out of its own treasury, or even
where it derives from the surplus funds of the industrial
company purchased, the transaction, from the tax point of
view, is properly unimpeachable. But where the purchase
price is largely deferred over a period of years, and is to be
derived wholly, or in large measure, from future profits of
the industrial company acquired, by the tax exempt entity,
a difficult problem is presented both to the tax administrators and to the courts. By the process of forming special
ad hoc foundations for each purchase, the sole assets of which
are to be the stock of the industrial company purchased, the
unequivocal undertaking of the foundation to pay the pur12 Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Com. of Int. Rev., 96 F. 2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938);
Corn. of Int. Rev. v. Orton, 173 F. 2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949).
13 Though the corporation acquired should ultimately be held to be taxable
by refusal of the Supreme Court to follow the doctrine of the Roche's Beach
case, supra note 12, and the adoption of the views expressed by Judge Learned
Hand in his dissenting opinion in that case, there seems to be no basis for
denying the ordinary incidents of a sale to a transaction whereby stockholders
sell all or part of their stock to a tax exempt institution.
14 This much can well be said to have been settled in the Trinidad case,
supra note 11.
35 Ibid. See also note 10 supra.
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chase price is deprived of practical significance. Where the
foundation agrees to make payments on account of the purchase price, and its only source of revenue will be income
derived from the acquired industrial company, a strange
series of results follows. The industrial company itself
might escape taxation, and its profits, or a substantial portion thereof over a number of years, will come into the hands
of the original stockholders, subject only to the capital gain
tax. If such results are within the scope of congressional
intent, all is well, for they can be firmly supported by economic policy. But if Congress does not intend to effect such
a policy, it is clear that clarification is needed on the legislative level. For it would seem that without such clarification the proposed escape from the aforementioned taxpayers'
dilemma must necessarily be deemed to be free from administrative or judicial condemnation.
A specific example will help to clarify the problem. A
large university, whose income is clearly tax exempt, proposes to buy all the stock of a manufacturing corporation.
The agreed purchase price is $5,000,000, but the university
is unwilling to risk either its funds or its credit in the enterprise. Let us assume that the manufacturing company has a
cash surplus, above its business requirements, of $1,000,000,
and net profits, before taxes, annually of approximately
$500,000. There are several mechanisms which are customarily used in this type of situation, of which only one need
be discussed. A new foundation is created by the university;
its control is in the hands of the university authorities, and
its charter provides that all its income must be utilized for
the purposes of the university. The new foundation is endowed with but a most nominal capital, and it acquires the
stock of the manufacturing company in consideration of its
specific promise to pay $5,000,000 therefor as follows:
$1,000,000 upon purchase, and the balance in sixteen annual
installments of $250,000 each. The first payment is made by
the foundation by drawing out as a tax free dividend the entire cash surplus of the acquired company. The remaining
payments will be made out of tax free dividends received by
the foundation from future operations of the manufacturing
company. If the manufacturing company is likewise tax
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exempt, as it may be under certain circumstances, the benefits to the parties will be immediate, otherwise, somewhat
delayed. By this rather simple device, $5,000,000 of ordinary
income has been converted into a capital gain.
The points of administrative attack on this device are
few and singularly unimpressive. It might, of course, first
be argued that we are not dealing here with a genuine sale.16
But why not? Is it because the purchaser is made of straw,
and its solemn undertaking to pay is without meaningful
worth? But such transactions are everyday occurrences in
business, particularly in the sale of real estate. The presence
of an unequivocal obligation to pay is usually sufficient to
denominate the transaction a sale. It has never been suggested that the purchaser must also be a man of means.
Of course, if it should be held that the dividends received by the foundation were not exempt from taxes, the
plan would fall to achieve its purpose. But is such a holding within the realm of the probable? Clearly not. It has
already been held by the Supreme Court of the United States,
in a much cited and relied upon decision, that dividends received by a tax exempt corporation are exempt from the income tax. 17 What is there in the fact that the foundation
controls and operates the business, to change the incidence
of this rule? To be sure there is a factual difference and it
is one that legislation may well deal with. But surely there
is nothing here that the courts may seize upon as a basis for
]imiting the area of tax exemption of those institutions
which are specifically exempted by Section 101 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Should it turn out that the encouragement of such sales
is contra-indicated by a sound public policy, numerous legislative devices are available for their discouragement. For
example, foundations formed in the future might be required
to be of a certain age, say three to five years, before they
could enjoy tax exemption; or limitations might be imposed
"8Thal v. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 142 F. 2d 874 (6th Cir.
1944) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hopkinson, 126 F. 2d 406, 409-10
(2d Cir. 1942); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Moore, 48 F. 2d 526
(10th Cir. 1931).
27 Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, tspra note 11.
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upon the powers of tax exempt corporations to incur obligations, or to manage, operate or control business concerns.
The discussion thus far has been of a method of solving
the stockholder's tax dilemma, by the liquidation or sale of
the enterprise.
Where the stockholder desires to remain an active participant in the business and to derive business benefits therefrom in the future, the sale of the stock or the liquidation
of the corporation does not meet his requirements and the
problem must squarely be faced as to whether or not there
exists any form of reorganization which will have the effect
of separating the cash surplus from the corporation and
making it available to the stockholder or stockholders, and
at the same time freeing it from the imposition of the tax on
dividends.
It should, of course, be borne in mind that any plan of
reorganization which has for its primary purpose the achievement of this end must necessarily fail. Mere compliance
with the letter of the law will not avoid the tax under the
current doctrines of the Supreme Court, unless there exists,
at least in addition to the tax avoidance purpose, another
business purpose which by itself would justify and explain
the reorganization. What we are here saying to the taxpayer is this: You may not take advantage of the provisions
for corporate reorganization contained in the Internal
Revenue Code merely for the purpose of avoiding a tax on
dividends. But, if you have a genuine business purpose
which would justify your reorganization on its own merits,
the incidental avoidance of the tax on dividends will not be
an insurmountable hazard. In such cases, it is suggested
that the tax might be avoided if the court could be convinced
that a genuine business purpose is being served.' 8
It is not difficult to devise a plan of reorganization
which will comply with the letter of Section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code and which will effectively separate the
Is Darrell, Recent Developments inz Non-Taxable Reorga,,izations and Stock
Dividends, 61 HARV. L. REv. 958 (1948).
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cash surplus from the operating company and make the cash
available to the stockholders without subjecting the trans-

action to any tax at all. The definition of the term "reorganization" in Section 112 '1 permits the transfer of all or part

of the assets of a corporation to another corporation without
the recognition of gain or loss if, immediately after such
transfer, the transferor corporation, or its stockholders, are
in control of the transferee corporation. Thus, if a corpora-

tion with a large, but not needed cash surplus, should transfer all of its assets, exclusive of such cash surplus, to a new

corporation formed for the purpose, and the new corporation,
in consideration of such transfer, should distribute its stock
among the stockholders of the transferor corporation, a nontaxable reorganization would take place within the letter of
the statute, and would comply with the provisions of Sec-

tion 112(g), as well as Section 112(b) (4) of the Internal
Revenue Code. 20

Prior to the doctrine of Helvering v.

'9INT. REV. CODE § 112(g), defining a "reorganization," provides, in part,
as follows: "A transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to
another corporation if immediately after the transfer, the transferor or its
shareholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are
transferred .... "
20 INT. REv. CODE § 112(b) (4) provides that "No gain or loss shall be
recognized if a corporation a party to a reorganization, exchanges property, in
pursuance of the plan of reorganization, solely for stock or securities in another corporation a party to the reorganization."
This language is not sufficient to cover the hypothetical case suggested in
the text, where a corporation transfers property to another corporation, and
the stock of the transferee is issued directly to the stockholders of the transferor corporation. But since the definition of "Reorganization" in Section
112(g) (1)(D) includes a case where there is "a transfer by a corporation of
all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the
transfer the transferor or its shareholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred," it has been held that such a
transaction is covered by Sections 112(b) (4) and 112(g). Clyde Baron, Inc.
v. Com. of Int. Rev., 4 T. C. 1107, 1118, 1119 (1945). But quacre, does this
decision give proper consideration to the history of the statute? The Revenue
Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 169 (1932), contained an old provision, numbered Section 112(g), as follows: "If there is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of
reorganization, to a shareholder in a corporation a party to the reorganization,
stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to
the reorganization, without the surrender by such shareholder of stock or
securities in such a corporation, no gain to the distributee from the receipt of
such stock or securities shall be recognized." This language precisely covered
the hypothetical case instanced in the text. But Section 112(g) of the 1932
Act was omitted from all subsequent acts. Referring to this section, the
Report of the House Committee on V.rays and Means in the 73rd Congress
(2d session), 14, stated: ". . . the Committee recommends that Section 112(g)
be omitted from the bill. This paragraph provides that a corporation, by means
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Gregory, 21 it would not have been thought that such a
transaction would be taxable under any statutes, and the
transferor corporation might, upon the completion of the
transaction, be retained by the stockholders as a personal
holding company, as a vehicle for making new investments
not within the scope of the old investments; or it might be
liquidated and the cash distributed to the stockholders on a
capital gain basis. All this was possible in the halcyon preNew Deal, pre-depression, pre-Roosevelt days, when finance
had learned, as one jurist put it, 22 to improve on the re-

sourcefulness of Becky Sharp by learning to live on no reported income at all, without in any way reducing its
revenues. But in these days, much more than mere compliance with the provisions of the statute is required before a
reorganization is permitted to be tax exempt by the courts.
It must also appear that the reorganization has a "business
purpose," that is, a logical reason for its effectuation, other
than the saving of some tax dollars. It has, however, not yet
been held that the tax saving motive must be entirely absent.
The furthest the statute has gone is to condemn transactions
23
where the "primary motive" is the avoidance of the tax.
Non constat. But where other good and valid motives exist
for entering into the transaction, the mere fact that tax
avoidance is also one of the motives, as long as it is not the
primary motive, will not prevent the exemption from accruing.
The reader will not find it difficult at this point to reconstruct the very words of the conference between the tax
lawyer and his client. The lawyer will be pointing out that
the plan of reorganization, while completely tax exempt by
the express language of the statute, can, nevertheless, not
hope to achieve its purpose unless some entirely valid and inof a reorganization, may distribute to its shareholders stock or securities in
another corporation a party to the reorganization without any tax to the shareholders. By this method, corporations have found it possible to pay what would
otherwise be taxable dividends, without any taxes on their shareholders. The
Committee believes that this means of avoidance should be ended."
21293 U. S. 465 (1935).
22 PCORA, WALL STREET UNaE OATH 189 (1939).
23 Thus, in INT. REV. CODE § 112(k), the tax exemption is denied if "the
principal purpose" of the taxpayer is to "avoid federal income tax." See also
PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 290 et seq. (2d ser. 1938).
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dependent motive for embarking on the plan is primarily
responsible for its being undertaken. The client, mindful of
the necessity for protecting his reputation for integrity, will
be saying that he has long been wanting to rearrange his
affairs in this way quite independently of any tax considerations. Pressed, he will point out that he is getting on in
years and that he has been thinking of passing some of the
responsibility on to younger shoulders; and, of course, it is
necessary to give them some stock interest in the company in
order to motivate their resourcefulness. Before this can be
done, however, it seems idle to have so much cash in the company treasury, as the cost of the stock would then be beyond
the reach of the young people. Or a proposed merger with
another company cannot be arranged because of the presence
of the embarrassing cash surplus. Or the stockholders wish
to invest in another business, not connected with the old
business, and to the risk of which the assets of the old business ought not to be subjected. Other situations of like import will arise in the mind of either the lawyer or his client,
and the unanswered question in each case will be: Is this a
business purpose of which the court spoke as the sine qua
non of a valid tax free reorganization?
It was freely predicted, 24 after the decision by the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering, that the effect of the
decision would not be a change in the law, but merely a
burden upon the ingenuity of counsel. "Business purposes"
would have to be found and indicated to the court where
prior thereto a mere literal compliance with the statute
would have been deemed sufficient.
Presumably, however, there may be a perfectly valid
business reason for a reorganization which is significant for
the stockholders of a corporation, but of no consequence
whatsoever to the corporation as an entity, or to the conduct
of its business. The question is thereupon presented,
whether such a "business purpose" is condemned by the rule
in Gregory v. Helvering. The dissenting opinion in the
2- Sandberg, Income Tax Subsidy to "Reorganization," 38 CoL. L. Rmv. 98,
116 (1938).
"Cases like Chisholn v. Conmnissioner and Bremer v. White
indicate that the net result of the principle, so startling and revolutionary when
first announced, may be merely to require greater artistry of the tax lawyer."
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Bazley 25 case would seem to indicate that the dissenting
justices were of the opinion that the business purpose referred to in Gregory v. Helvering was any business purpose,
whether that of the corporation or of its stockholders, as
distinguished from the corporation. In that case, the dissenting opinion pointed out that a perfectly valid business
purpose of the stockholders did, in fact, exist.2 6 Strangely
enough, the majority did not affirmatively deal with this
point of view. In the prevailing opinion, no attempt was
made to distinguish between the business purpose of the
corporation and the business purpose of the stockholders.
Instead, the court contented itself with holding that the purported recapitalization in the Bazley case, which complied
with the statute "as inert language," 27 was not the kind of
recapitalization to which tax exemption was afforded by the
statute. Indeed, in so far as there is any expression of
opinion from the court as to the meaning of the words "business purpose," the indications are that the requirement may
be satisfied even if the business purpose be that only of the
stockholders, and one in which the corporate entity as such
has no interest. Thus, the Supreme Court, through Mr.
Justice Reed, in two cases involving the exchange of stock of
a corporation for its bonds, said: "There is not present in
either situation the wholly useless temporary compliance
with statutory literalness which this court condemned as
futile, as a matter of law, in Gregory v. HeIrering. The
demonstrated possibility of sales by the holders of the obligations to persons other than stockholders alone proves the
differentiation." 28 In these cases, a family owned corporation issued interest bearing, unsecured obligations which
were distributed to the stockholders, mainly in exchange for
their capital stock. The precise problem involved in the
cases was whether payments of interest on these obligations
were deductible by the corporation as an expense, or whether
25 Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 737 (1937), affirning 155 F. 2d 237
(3d Cir. 1946). Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Burton dissented for
reasons stated in the joint dissent of Judges Maris and Goodrich below.
26 Ibid., 155 F. 2d at 245.
27 See majority opinion in the Ba&7ey case, supra note 25.
28 John Kelley Co. v. Com. of Int. Rev., 326 U. S. 521, 525-6 (1946).
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the Commissioner was correct in holding, in one case at least,
that the distributions were, in effect, dividends. However,
while the precise point here discussed was not involved,
namely, the propriety of exchanging stock of a corporation
for its bonds within the safeguards afforded by Section 112
of the Internal Revenue Code, nevertheless, the language
quoted above indicates that the court was of the opinion that
where the bonds are freely salable by the stockholders to
others than stockholders, that circumstance alone distinguishes the case from Gregory .v. Helvering. This, of course,
would be a facile mode of syphoning the cash surplus, on a
capital gain basis, by the ultimate redemption of the bonds.
It is difficult to square the language thus quoted above
with the holding in the Bazley case, for in the latter case,
too, the stockholders received bonds of the corporation, and
the stockholders were free to sell the bonds to others than
stockholders. Yet this consideration, which was said by the
Supreme Court "alone" to differentiate the case from
Gregory v. Helvering, was held not to be sufficient to endow
the transaction with the statutory exemption. Under these
circumstances, it is small wonder that applications for rulings in situations of this kind are not dealt with sympathetically on the administrative level. Nor have we been
promised by the court any relief on the judicial level.
Rather, we are told that: "The search for relevant meaning
is often satisfied not by a futile attempt at abstract definition, but by pricking a line through concrete applications.
Meaning frequently is built up by assured recognition of
what does not come within the concept, the content of which
is in controversy." 29 There is always, however, the danger
that the line so pricked, may degenerate into a series of unrelated points through which no line, Euclidian or norfEuclidian, could be drawn.
While it may seem a virtue to the Supreme Court that
no specific definitions are provided, either by Congress, or
the court, the business man and the administrative officials
are left, by the absence of definitions, with no guide to the
29

Ibid.
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perplexed. Courageous taxpayers who are willing to risk all
for the purpose of trying out a theory on a new state of facts
by testing it with the conscience of the court, are encountered
infrequently, and, as a result, the points through which the
line of application is pricked are remotely spaced.
No doubt the ancient sage with whom we started was
more wise than we are. His dilemma was simple compared
with ours. He knew what the law is-we, alas, do not.
MAURICE FINKEISTEIN.

St. John's University School of Law.

